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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
LEONARD BATES, 
Plaintiff and Appellaml, 
-vs.-
ODELL WALKER BUR.NS, and ODELL 
WALKER BURNS, FARRELL BURNS 
and FRANK D. BURNS, doing business 
as a copartnership in the name and style 
of BURNS FEED AND SUPPLY COM-
PANY, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 
8207 
BRIEF ·OF· PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF' CASE 
The plaintiff brought this action to recover damages 
for personal injuries to himself and to property because 
of the negligence on the part of the defendants.. On the 
9th day of October, 1952, at around 2 o'clock P.M. at the 
intersection of Public Highway No. 91 and Highway No. 
114, otherwise known as Geneva Road, and on the north 
side of Highway 91, known as T'hird West Street in 
Pleasant Grove, Utah County, Utah, the defendant, Odell 
Walker Burns, was traveling West on Highway 91 and 
negligently, carelessly and heedlessly drove defendants' 
G.M.C. tractor and trailer loaded with twelve tons of 
coal, a motor vehicle, into the right side of plaintiff's 
emp~ty 1941 one ton International Pickup truck automoL.. 
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bile which the piaintiff was driving North on Highway 
114, known also as Geneva Road and as 3rd West Street 
in Pleasant Grove, Utah. As a result the plaintiff was 
injured severely. The case was tried to a jury which re-
turned a verdict for damages in favor of the plaintiff in 
the total amount of $5, 779.50. The verdict reads (omit-
ting the Court and case and title), as follows : 
We, the jury impaneled in the above entitled 
cause, find the issues in favor of the plaintiff and 
against the defendants jointly and severally and 
assess plaintiff's damages as follows: 
Physical injury, p·ain and suffering ________ $ __ _ 
Medical Exp·enses --------------------------·--------------$ 214.50 
Loss of earnings during recuperation ______ $1,000.00 
Permanent disability ------------------------------------$4,000.00 
Pickup truck --------------------------------------------------$ 565.00 
Total ---------------------_ ----------------------------------$5,779.50 
Dated March 16, 1954. 
Signed: Waldo Lamoreaux 
Foreman 
The Court, notwithstanding the verdict, on motion of 
defendants, ordered, adjudged and decreed that the ver-
dict and judgment enteTed therein in favor of the plain-
tiff he set aside and ordered, adjudged and decreed that 
judgment he entered in favor of defendants and against 
the plaintiff, NO CAUSE. OF· ACTION, and that defend-
ants recover their costs, on the theory that plaintiff was 
contributarily negligent as a matter of law and that the 
verdict is against the law. 
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The plaintiff ruppeals from the judgment by the 
Court upon the ground that the· Court faile;d to accept 
as true in arriving at its decision all the competent evi-
dence in favor of the plaintiff, and further failed to give 
the plaintiff the benefit of every favorable! inference 
which reasonably could be drawn from such evidence. 
The court also erred in its interpretation of the evidence·, 
and in arriving at its conclusion included as evidence 
matters which it had specifically excluded from evidence 
during the trial of the case. The Court also erred in 
showing in its judgment a cipher opposite the first item 
appearing in the verdict of the jury, "Physical injury, 
pain and suffering" when no such cipher appeared in the 
original verdict handed in by the jury, thus showing a 
variance between the actual verdict of the jury and the 
Court's version of it, and then refusing to delete it al-
though on motion duly requested so to do. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit "A", a map or sketch to a scale 
of 1" equals 25 feet, showing the intersection and sur-
rounding area where the accident occurred, also scale 
to the rna p, Exhibit "F" ( Tr. 12), were both identified, 
introduced and received in evidence, excepting therefrom 
the markings upon the highway on the map Exhibit "A" 
with respect to distances ( Tr. 3 and 8, 9 and 10 exclude-d 
the markings). Herbert M. Felunel, engineer No. 3 for 
the State Road Commission, testified he drew the map 
to measurement on a scale 1" equals 25 feet. He also 
identified the scale to the ma;p or sketch as Exhibit "F" 
(Tr. 13-14) as also being gauged 1" equals 25 feet. Heal-
so testified that where the ~sight line from the southeast 
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corner of Highway 114 at the stop sign intersects the 
center line of Highway 91 in an easterly direction was a 
distance of 368 feet from the center line of Highway 114 
at the scene of the impact in the intersection of the two 
highways (Tr. 12). Mr. Fehmel further testified that 
the black markings or lines crossing the center line of 
Highway 91 were ~ngineering stations 100 feet apart. 
Mr. Holdaway t.estified that he had stopped at the 
stop sign on the N (lTthwest corner of 3rd North Street 
in Pleasant Grove ("Highway 114) and Highway 91. He. 
marked an "X" on the map to show approximately where 
the front of his car would be while there (Tr. 15). He 
testified that he saw the coal truck approaching from the 
East on Highway 91 at from 40 to 50 miles per hour (Tr. 
17). That·it passed the front of his car within a few 
inches (Tr. 18), and that the coal truck was 50 to 75 feet 
from him when its brakes were first applied .. 
Plaintiff Bates testified he waited for some minutes 
at stop· sign before entering the intersection of Highway 
91 and Highway 114. (Tr. 53). He looked both ways and 
the road was clear (Tr. 53). He started across High-
way 91 at 5 or 6 miles an hour in low gear (Tr. 54). His 
truck was hit by the defendant's coal truck when he was 
pretty near across the Highway 91. The defendant's 
truck ·was about 150 feet a\vay coming very fast when he 
saw it. Plaintiff attempted to speed up a little on the 
last end (Tr. 54). Plaintiff's truck was damaged beyond 
repair (Tr. 57) and he was injured. Plaintiff Bates and 
Myrtle C. Bates, his wife, testified concerning p~laintiff's 
injuries. His injuries consisted of a cut on the back of 
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his head 21h" long (Tr. 59, also Tr. 27). His face was 
scratched up and was a mass of abrasions ( Tr. 54 and 
27). A lump, about the size of a walnut was raised on his 
right cheek bone (Tr. 27). He had a lump· on his fore-
head ahnost as big as an egg (Tr. 27 and 54). His right 
eye was swollen shut (Tr. 27). His knees were banged 
up (Tr. 59). He had a sprained shoulder (Tr. 27). His 
hands were swollen and he could not shut them (Tr. 27). 
He had 7 fractured ribs (stipulated to by counsel for 
plaintiff and defendan t.s.) ( Tr. 29 and 30). Plaintiff had 
an hemorrhage from the mouth. Plaintiff was unable to 
do anything and even at the time of the trial was still 
unable to do anything. Plaintiff's entire body seemed to 
be affected, his mind is not clear, and his memory is not 
good. It was excellent before the accident (Tr. 31). He 
remained in the Ameri~can Fork Hospital for three days 
(Tr. 30). Ever since the accident (one year and one 
half ago) the plaintiff's back has bothered him and his 
side has bothered him. He has had pains in his side ( Tr. 
39). Since the accident he drives a truck or car very 
little. His wife does practically all of the driving ( Tr. 
38). 
Defendant did not see plaintiff until he was right on 
him (Tr. 45). Defendant stated he saw the plaintiff as 
he pulled out to start across the highway (Tr. 130). De-
fendant said he saw the plaintiff when the defendant was 
100 feet away (Tr. 130). Plaintiff was quite aways from 
the yellow line when the defendant saw him (Tr. 136). 
Defendant took it for granted the plaintiff would yield 
the right of way to him as he figured he was entitled to 
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it (T·r. 137). D·efenda.nt says the plaintiff and defendant 
were both in the intersection at the same time (Tr. 137). 
Defendant says he was traveling at 35 miles p.er hour 
(Tr. 137). 
Dr. Christopherson was going South on Highway 
114 and watched the plaintiff p·roceed across Highway 91 
through the rear view mirror of his Packard automobile 
and saw the pl~intiff get nearly across, or approximately 
two-thirds of the way across, the highway when the coal 
truck came into his vision (Tr. 97). It was then 20 feet 
from the point of impact (Tr. 104). He said the impact 
took p·lace from 6 to 10 feet north of the center line of 
Highway 91 (Tr. 98). Dr. Christopherson did not stop 
his car. He was traveling around 30 miles per hour and 
slowed down to 15 to 20 miles per hour, took his foot off 
the accelerator and p~ut on the brake just a little (Tr. 99). 
He did not eome to a complete stop· but ~slowed down to 
10 miles an hour. He went south 50 yards beyond the stop 
sign from whence the plaintiff started north before the 
accident occurred. 
Mack Ostergaard, the peace officer for Linden, Utah 
(Tr. 106) said defendant told him "I did not have a 
chance. He pulled right in front of me." The defendant 
said his speed was 35 miles per hour. "His d~stance from 
the point-from the distance that he first noticed the 
danger was 10 to 20 feet-something like that" (Tr. 108-
109). "There was another car p·arked by the other stop 
sign on the north side of the street, and to avoid hitting 
one of them ·he tried to go between the two * * *" (Tr .. 
108). Ostergaard said Burns knew of the dangerous 
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intersection (Tr. 109). Mr. Ostergaard placed an "X" 
in a circle on Exhibit "A" where he saw scuff marks and 
drew parallel curved lines for 22 feet to rep,resent scuff 
marks of coal truck. Ostergaard testified that the defend-
ant's truck traveled from the point of impact and passed 
between the stop ~sign and telephone pole on the north-
west corner of the intersection of Highway 91 and High-
way 114 (Third West in Pleasant Grove) into a lot and 
hitting a shed, a distance of 188 feet. A triangle with a 
"T" in it on Exhibit "A" illustrates the location of the 
shack (Tr. 110). (Th·e shack also is shown on Exhibit 
"A" according to the actual measurements..) The reaction 
time at 35 miles per hour would be 55 feet. 55 feet plus 
22 feet of brake marks would total 77 feet at 35 miles per 
hour where the defendant saw the plaintiff's truck (Tr. 
116 and 117). The average reaction time for the aver-
age individual is three-quarters of a second and a truck 
traveling 35 miles per hour would travel one and one 
half times the speed per second ( Tr. 118). 
The foregoing s.ubstantially states the case, omitting 
only such details as do not bear directly on this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
The ruppellant will present his case under four 
points: 
POINT ONE 
THE COURT FAILED TO ACCEPT AS TR·UE ALL OF 
THE COMPETENT EVIDENCE IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF 
AND TO GIVE TO THE PLAINTIFF THE BENEFIT OF 
EVERY FAVORABLE INFERENCE WHICH NATURALLY 
COULD BE DRAWN FROM SUCH EVIDENCE. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
8 
POINT TWO 
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS INTERPRETATION OF 
PART OF THE EVIDENCE. 
POINT THREE 
THE COURT RELIED UPON MATTERS WHICH IT HAD 
SPECIFICALLY EXCLUDED AS EVIDENCE. 
P·OINT FOUR 
INACCURATELY COPYING JURY VERDICT INTO ITS 




THE COURT FAILED TO ACCEPT AS TRUE ALL OF 
THE COMPETENT EVIDENCE IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF 
AND TO GIVE TO THE PLAINTIFF THE BENEFIT OF 
EVERY FAVORABLE INFERENCE WHICH NATURALLY 
COULD BE DRAWN FROM SUCH EVIDENCE. 
Fnr the purpose of arriving at a decision of negli-
gence .as a matter of law, the Court must take into con-
'sideration all the evidence most favorable to the plain-
tiff, and give to the plaintiff the benefit of every favor-
able inference which naturally could he drawn from such 
evidence. See 109 P. 2nd 1064 (Wash.) Fetterman v. 
Levitch. 
Here are some of the matters the Court must con-
sider. It must take into account that plaintiff's Exhibits 
"A" and "F·" are true and correct, that the plaintiff had 
traveled north from the stop sign into the intersection of 
Highway 91 a distance of 125 feet at a speed of approxi-
mately 5 miles p~er hour, and that the defendant was 
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traveling eastward on Highway 91 at the speed rate of 
50 miles ~per hour in a 40 mile zone (Tr. 17). Giving to 
the plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inferenc~ 
which naturally could be drawn from such evidence, it 
means that the defendant was traveling ten times faster 
than the plaintiff and that the defendant was ten times 
125 feet, or a total orf 1250 feet, down Highway 91 from 
the point of impact when the plaintiff started from the 
stop sign into the intersection. It means that when the 
plaintiff had traveled 50 feet into the intersection, at 
the same ratio of ten to one, the defendant was still 750 
feet away from the point of impact. Traveling another 
50 feet would place the plaintiff north 100 feet from the 
stop sign on to Highway 91 and at the center of said 
highway. (Use Exhibits "A" and "F" for location on 
map.) The defendant would then be 250 feet away from 
the point of impact. While the plaintiff traveled the last 
25 feet, the defendant traveled ten times as far, or 250 
feet, to the point where the impact took place. On the 
basis of this evidence most favorable to the plaintiff, 
just where on Highway 91 would the imp~act have taken 
place~ There .are certain stationary monuments that lend 
a certainty to the answer. They are like rabbit tracks 
in the snow. Note the stop sign on the sketch Exhibit 
"A" at the northwest corner of the intersection and also 
the telephone pole slightly to the southwest of it. These 
two monuments are approximately 10 to 15 feet apart. 
(See Exhibits "A" and "F") The coal truck of the de-
fendants passed between these two monuments and 
knocked down a shack in the vacant lot some distance 
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ahead (Tr. 110). If a sight line were to he drawn from 
Highway 91 northwestward so that it extended midway 
between the stop sign and the telephone pole and within 
inches of the ·front of the Holdaway car (Tr. 18), one 
would at once be able to fix the course of the coal truck 
with a fair degree of accuracy. The stop sign and the 
telephone pole are visible and stationary. The Holdaway 
car help~s define the eourse of defendants' truck. They 
are much like the visible rabbit tracks in the snow. The 
imp,act, therefore, would have occurred on what would 
have been, but for the intersection of Highway 114, on 
the north shoulder of Highway 91. (Use Exhibits "A" 
and "F" for location on map.) That would place the 
front of plaintiff's truck 5 feet over on the north shoulder 
of Highway 91. Plaintiff's truck is 17 feet long. The up-
right on the left side of the front bumper on defendant's 
coal truck struck the right front fender of plaintiff's 
truck about four or more feet from the front of his 
truck. (See Exhibits "B", "C", "D" and "E", particularly 
Exhibit "E".) That ~simply means that the plaintiff's 
truck at the time of the impact occupied only the North 
12 feet, or thereabouts, of Highway 91lea:ving a clearance 
of 8 feet to the south of plaintiff's truck on the north one 
half of Highway 91 for defendant's coal truck to pass 
p~laintiff's truck without hitting it and still be mostly in 
its p-rop~er lane. The ·defendant's truck at its widest point 
is 8 feet wide. There is no evidence that there was any 
traffic ap~proaching from the "\vest on Highway 91. In 
fact, there would be none because the plaintiff had just 
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crossed that lane and had there been the plaintiff would 
have seen it. 
The defendant was negligent in three particulars: 
(1) in traveling in excess of the legal speed rate for said 
district; (2) in failing to keep a p-roper lookout, and (3) 
in failing to yield the right of way to the plaintiff who 
had acquired it by reason of having entered the inter-
section first and progressed almost through it before 
the defendant entered it. 
1. Had the defendant traveled at a legal rate of 40 
miles per hour (Tr. 17), the natural favorable inference 
drawn from that fact is that the plaintiff would have been 
clear of the intersection by an additional 25 feet or more. 
Instead of covering 1250 feet as defendant did, defendant 
would have traveled only four-fifths of that distance, 
or 1000 feet. While the defendant would have traveled 
that last 250 feet at 40 miles per hour, the plaintiff would 
have traveled further north 31.25 feet through the inter-
section than he did ( 5 miles per hour is one-eighth of 40 
miles per hour, one eighth of 250 feet is 31.25 feet). (Ex-
hibits "A" and "F" will help to pinpoint plaintiff's posi-
tion with regard to the intersection.) He would have been 
completely through it. That would make defendant's 
excessive speed doubtless the p~ro~imate cause of the 
collision. 
2. Had the defendant kept a p,roper lookout, he 
could have driven to the rear of plaintiff's truck on High-
way 91 and have avoided the accident, or he could have 
slowed down for plaintiff to clear the intersection. The 
defendant Burns' testimony as to the point where he first 
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saw the plaintiff's truck is confusing. He said he first 
saw the plaintiff's truck at the stop· sign and saw it start 
up when the defendant was 100 feet away (Tr. 130). 
Later he ~said he saw it when it was in the intersection 
before it reached the yellow line (meaning the center line 
of Highway 91), when he was 100 feet from the point of 
impact. Of these two conflicting statements plaintiff is 
entitled to the benefit of the defendant's testimony which 
is more favorable to the plaintiff, and to every favorable 
inference which naturally could be drawn from such tes-
timony. Defendant Burns on direct examination says he 
saw the plaintiff at the stop sign (Tr.130): 
A. I saw this vehicle pulling out to start across 
the highway and when I first saw him I 
thought he saw me and would stop and per-
mit me to pass. As I got closer I could see 
he wasn't, so I turned to the right as much 
as I could, hut still stay on the highway, and 
he kept coming. Of course, I ran into him 
* * * 
That the defendant Burns meant the stop sign at the 
southeast corner of Highway 114 and Highway 91 where 
he saw the plaintiff there can be no doubt, for he further 
says: 
Q. Describe the course that the Bates truck took 
from the time you first saw him, until the im-
pact occurred, as to whether or not there were 
any variations in stopp~ing or starting, or 
anything of that nature. 
A. As near as I could tell, there was no changing 
or stopping, other than starting up, from the 
stopped position which he was in. I don't 
know whether he gained any speed from the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
13 
time he left until he got there or not. It 
seemed that he drove directly north and did 
not turn one way or the other. 
Later on cross examination the defendant testified 
to just the op~posite effect, namely, that he did not see 
the plaintiff until the plaintiff was approaching the cen-
ter line of Highway 91. At transcript 136 plaintiff's coun-
sel asked the defendant: 
Q. Why did not you, when you first saw the 
Bates' truck attempt to stop or slow down~ 
A. When I first saw him~ 
Q. Yes. 
A. Well, the fact that I didn't stop or slow down 
is that he was quite a long ways from the 
yellow or center line of the highway, I took 
for granted that he would yield the right of 
way to me which I figured I was entitled to, 
and I didn't know that he was going to pull 
on across the highway in front of me. 
Defendant knew that this w.as a dangerous intersec-
tion from much prior experience (Tr. 44), and should 
have driven more cautiously on approaching this inter-
section. If the defendant had seen the plaintiff's truck 
starting from the stop sign into the intersection as he 
testified he did, and that he was then 100 feet from the 
point of impact, it would be the equivalent of defendant 
saying that the plaintiff was traveling at a much faster 
rate of speed than that of the defendant in order that 
they reach the point of impact at the same time. For 
defendant's testimony to be true he would have traveled 
100 feet while the plaintiff traveled 125 feet which would 
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make plaintiff's appro~imate· s·peed one-sixth faster than 
defendant's, or 58 miles per hour. Th~s is not tenable in 
the light of all the evidence that the pJ.aintiff was travel-
ing at the rate of 5 or 6 miles per hour, or traveling slow-
ly across the intersection. On the other hand, if the de-
fendant had not seen the plaintiff until he was within 100 
feet of the plaintiff when the plaintiff was nearing the 
center line of Highway 91 in the intersection, the defend-
ant was not only ordinarily negligent, he was grossly 
ne·gligent, in not seeing him. If the defendant had main-
taind a p,roper lookout ahead he could have driven to the 
rear of plaintiff's truck and thus have avoided the· acci-
dent. 
3. The defendant failed to yield the right of way 
to the p~laintiff after the plaintiff had clearly acquired 
it hy reason of his having entered the intersection first 
and having progressed nearly across it. 
Utah Code Annotated 1943, 57-7-138. Vehicle~s 
entering a through highway. - The driver of a 
vehicle shall stop as required by this act at the 
entrance to a through highway and shall yield 
the right of way to other vehicles which have en-
tered the intersection from said thr<)ugh highway 
or which are approaching so closely on said 
through highway as to constitute an immediate 
hazard, but said driver having so yielded may pro-
ceed and the drivers of all other vehicles ap-
proaching the intersection on said through high-
way shall yield the right of way to the vehicle 
so p~roceeding into or across the through highway. 
See .also 58 A.L.R. 1197 and 81 A.L.R. 185. 
The defendant testified (Tr. 137): "* * * I took for 
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granted that he [meaning the plaintiff] would yield the 
right of way to me which I figured I was entitled to, and 
I didn't knorw that he was going to p·ull on across the 
highway in front of me." Referring to the point 125 
feet north on Highway 91 from the point where the plain-
tiff started into the intersection would place the front of 
plaintiff's truck 5 feet north beyond what would ordin-
arily he the north edge of the northwest bound traffic 
lane of Highway 91. The defendants' coal truck would 
have to have been driven clear across the northwest 
hound lane of Highway 91 which is 20 feet wide (See 
Exhibits "A" and "F") and on to what would ordinarily 
he the shoulder of the road but for the intersection itself. 
This is to say, that the defendant went completely out of 
his course of travel and followed the plaintiff on to the 
north shoulder in order for the impact to take place at 
·the point of the north shoulder of Highway 91 where it 
actually took I)lace. Defendant's course gave the plaintiff 
no opportunity to avoid the impact of defendant's truck. 
Plaintiff had one of four decisions to make. First, he had 
the alternative of stopping. Traveling at the rate of five 
miles per hour before plaintiff could even apply his foot 
to the brake he would have traveled several feet, which. 
would have placed him directly in the course of the de-
fendants' truck. Second, he could not turn to the right 
because he would he turning directly into the oncoming 
coal truck of the defendants. Third, he could not make a 
left angle turn; it must be turned on a curve. It will be 
recalled that the Ho1daway car was stopped at the· stop 
sign on the northwest corner of Highway 114 and High-
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way 91 and hy turning to his left the plaintiff would have-
crashed into the Holdaway car. The only other alterna-
tive that was left to plaintiff was to attempt to speed up 
to avoid the coal truck crashing into his truck. That is 
exactly what the plaintiff did (Tr. 54), and that is what 
any ordinary p~rudent man would have done under like 
and ~similar circumstances. That is exactly what a jury 
of eight intelligent men concluded after they had care~ 
fully listened to all of the testimony and weighed all of 
the evidence in the case. (See jury verdict.) They brought 
in a verdict for the plaintiff. 
Defendant was clearly in the wrong in assuming that. 
he had the right of way regardless of the location of 
plaintiff's truck alre-ady in the right of way, for the 
plaintiff had p·reempted it for three reasons: First, by 
his having entered into the intersection long before the 
defendant was close to it, (1250 feet away), and second, 
by having traveled into the intersection so far that to all 
intents and p·urposes, he was pretty well across it before 
the defendant could reach the intersection, and third, 
that the plaintiff, until the defendant's coal truck had 
approached near enough to the intersection, could not 
ascertain what was in the defendant's mind, i.e., whether 
the defendant would continue forward and pass behind 
plaintiff's truck; whether defendant would slow down; or 
whether the defendant had seen the plaintiff in the mid-
dle of the intersection, or just what was in the defend-
ant's mind. 
The Utah case of Conklin v. Walsh, 193 P. 2nd 439, is 
an intersection case. The facts are somewhat analogous 
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to those of our case. Defendant A. H. Walsh Plwnbing 
Co.'s truck was being driven east on South Temple Street 
in Salt Lake City, Utah, an arterial highway, at a rate 
of speed somewhat between 35 to 45 miles per hour. The 
plaintiff Conklin's car was being driven south on "0" 
Street and crossing East South Temple Street at a rate 
of 10 to 15 miles per hour. The defendant saw the plain-
tiff's car start just north of the stop sign to cross South 
Temple Street when defendant was one-quarter of a 
block away. Defendant then looked to the right or ~south 
and did not again look to the north until the plaintiff was 
almost in front of him. The collision occurred and plain-
tiff sued for damages. 
The Court will take judicial notice that the blocks 
on the south side of South Temple Street in Salt Lake 
C~ty are 10 acres and the distance from Ninth East to 
Tenth East is 40 rods or 660 feet. One-quarter of a block 
would be one-fourth of 660 feet, or 165 feet. In other 
words, defendant was 165 feet away from the intersection 
when the plaintiff was about to enter the intersection of 
"0" Street and South Temple Street. The Court held 
that the defendant was guilty of negligence as a matter 
of law for his failure to see the plaintiff's automobile in 
time to avoid the accident. The Court said: 
"The duty to ke'ep a proper lookout app1ies 
as well to the favored as to the disfavored driver. 
Neither driver can excuse his own failure to ob-
serve because the other driver failed in his duty. 
Neither driver is at any time to be excused for 
want of vigilance or failure to see what is plain 
to be seen. Drivers are permitted to cross over 
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arterial highways after having stop~ped. True 
they mus:t yield the right of way to cars which ar~ 
close enough to constitute an immediate hazard. 
The rule, however, required the exercise of ~some 
judgment. There is still a duty on the part of 
the driver traveling the arterial highway to re-
main reasona;hly alert to the possibility of the 
disfavored driver starting across the intersection 
in the belief that he can cross in safety." 
The facts in our case and the Conklin v. Walsh case 
are p·arallel in the following particulars: 
Both .accidents. took place at an intersection where 
one highway was an arterial highway. The defendant 
in each case was driving on the arterial highway. Both 
defendants were favored and both p~laintiffs were. dis-
favored drivers. Both plaintiffs had entered the inter-
section first. Both p~laintiffs' car-s were struck by the 
cars of the defendants, and both plaintiffs suffered dam-
ages from the collisions which followed. 
In our case the defendants' coal truck was 750 feet 
away, or thereabouts, from the intersection when plain-
tiff entered it. In the Conklin v. Walsh case, the defend-
ant Walsh was only 165 feet, or thereabouts, away from 
the intersection when the plaintiff entered. In our case 
the plaintiff was more than one-half way through the 
intersection when he observed the defendants' truck ap-
p~roa:ching from his right 150 feet away and speeded up 
to get through the intersection in order to avoid being 
hit by the defendants' truck (Tr. 54). In the Conklin v. 
Walsh case the plaintiff did not see the def'endant's truck 
at all. In our case the defendant saw the plaintiff's car 
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in intersection when he was. 100 feet away from it and 
plaintiff was near the midd~e of intersection. In Conklm 
v. Walsh, the defendant did not see the plaintiff's ear in 
the intersection at all until it was too late to avoid the 
collision. In our case defendant followed plaintiff's 
truck to his right and struck it at a point which would he 
5 fe'et beyond the traveled part of Highway 91 and on to 
the shoulder of the road. There is another fact in our 
case which is not present in the Conklm v. Walsh case, 
viz: there were skid marks on Highway 91 of defendants' 
coal truck for a distance of 22 feet to the point of colli-
sion. Traveling at 50 miles per hour the reaction time 
of the defendant would be around 55 feet. That would 
make it a total of 77 feet from the point of the collision 
when defendant first saw the plaintiff in the intersection 
instead of 100 feet as testified to by the defendant. Con-
sidering the respective positions of the two trucks, plain-
tiff's and defendants', defendant under the circumstances 
could not have kept a proper lookout. There simply 
would not have been sufficient time to have done so un-
der the circumstances. There are then the statements of 
the defendant (Tr. 34) to Mrs. Myrtle Bates: "I didn't 
see him until just before I hit him," and to Mrs. Hilda 
Pulley (Tr. 45) "* * * didn't see him, until he was right 
onto him, and he applied his brakes, but it was too late." 
It is clearly evident that defendant Burns did not 
act reasonably alert so as to yield the right of way to 
the plaintiff who had established his prior right to it by 
reason of his having entered it first and having traveled 
practically through it. The rules announeed in the Conk-
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lin v. Walsh case ap~plied to the facts. in our case would 
require overruling the Court's decision and reinstating 
the verdict of the jury. 
With all of the conflict in testimony in our case it 
was surely a case for the jury to decide. 
Reference is made to the Utah case of Martin v. 
Stevens, 243 P. 2nd 747, decided in 1952, which·is also 
an intersection case, and the cases cited therein. In the 
Martin v. Stevens case the plaintiff's automobile was 
struck in the middle by defendant's automobile at inter-
section of 18th East and Stratford Avenue, Salt Lake 
City, Utah. There was no stop sign at this intersection 
and neither street was an arterial highway. Defendant 
was traveling at 35 miles per hour in a 25 mile per hour 
zone. Plaintiff had entered intersection first. Other 
facts too detailed to include in this brief resulted in a de-
cision by the District Court in favor of defendant on 
theory that plaintiff was contributorily negligent. On 
appeal the Sup-reme Court held that whether the plaintiff 
had been guilty of contributory negligence in not seeing 
and avoiding effects of defendant's negligence, and if so, 
whether such failure was proximate cause of the collision, 
were questions for the jury. In the course of the opinion 
(Sylihus 4) the Court among other things said, quoting 
from 2 Blashfield Cyclopedia of Automobile Law and 
Practice, Perm. Ed. Sec. 991 to 994 inclusive, pp. 206 et 
seq: "* * * The second rule is easier to apply and there-
fore more :satisfactory, that is: * * * This rule has been 
called the basic law governing operation of vehicles at 
street intersections." The Court then said: "Necessity 
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dictates that this rule governs unless one vehicle is 
enough ahead of the other in entering the intersection 
to assure him a clear margin of safety." In our case the 
plaintiff had the right of way. He approached and en-
tered the intersection so far ahead of the defendant that 
no doubt could arise as to which had the right of way on 
that basis. In Sylibus 7 the Court said, among other 
things, that plaintiff: "* * *was not obliged to anticipate 
either that other drivers would drive negligently, nor fail 
to accord him his right of way, until in the exercise of due 
care, he observed, or should have observed, something 
to warn him that the other driver was driving negligently 
or would fail to accord him his right of way." (For the 
same rule of law see Hess v. Robinson, 109 Utah 60, 163 
P. 2nd 510.) The question is truly for the jury to decide 
as plaintiff observed the defendants' truck when it was 
150 feet down the highway. At this point, when he was 
over half way across the highway, defendant apparently 
had not seen plaintiff in the intersection, and was making 
no attempt to slow down in order to avoid a collision. 
Plaintiff then tried to speed up~ and to avoid the accident 
and defendant followed in the direction that the plain-
tiff was going instead of trying to pass to plaintiff's 
rear and thus avoid the collision. 
In the case of Lowder v. Holley, Utah, 233 P. 2nd 350, 
plaintiff failed to observe defendant's vehicle approach-
ing from the right and defendant was 250 feet away. 
(Our case defendant was 750 feet away when plaintiff 
entered the intersection.) The Court held that whether 
plaintiff's failure to see defendant's approach was negli-
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gence was a question of fact for the jury. So also our 
case should he a question of fact for the jury. The Court 
also observed that had plaintiff seen the defendant it 
could be found to he within his duty of due care to assume 
that the defendant would yield the right of way .. 
The case of Porulson v. Marvness, Utah, 241 P. 2nd 
152, p~resented the question of whether p~laintiff's failure 
to look again after he had looked to his right and left 
before starting into the intersection and no traffic was in 
sight for a distance of 400 feet (his visibility sight dis-
tance), and was struck constituted negligence and also 
whether such negligence proximately contributed to 
cause the collision, was held to have been properly 
submitted to the jury. See also Hard1nan v. Thurmmn, 
239 P~ 2d 215, and Nielson v. Mauchley, 202 P. 2nd 547, 
for ap·plication of the same rule. 
POINT TWO 
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS INTERPRETATION OF 
PART OF THE EVIDENCE. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit "A" is a map or sketch drawn to 
a scale of 1" equals 25 feet, covering the intersection of 
Highways 91 and 114 and surrounding area. It was ad-
mitted in evidence "excepting as to markings upon the 
highway with resp·ect to distances and locations, and the 
possible change in respect to one corner of the intersec-
tion, which are not received in evidence at this time, with-
out their being sup~p~orted by the· record." (Tr.3). 
The markings on the highway with respect to dis-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
23 
tances and locations have reference to the red sight di~s­
tance line extending easterly from stop sign at southeast 
corner of Highway 114, the distance line in green s·hown 
on Highway 91, and the figures shown upon it. It will be 
noted on Exhibit "A" that the line shown on Highway 
91 is broken up into three parts and the figures showing 
the distances in feet from left to right are the following: 
45', 52' and 268'. Adding these figures together they 
total 365 feet, which would represent the total linear 
feet from the sight distance point on Highway 91 to the 
point of impact. Since these figures were not admitted 
in evidence they can ,have no bearing on the outcome of 
the case, excepting only that they might later be sup-
ported by the evidence ( Tr. 3). The figures were not 
later ·supported by the evidence but the sight distance 
line was later supported by the evidence (Tr. 9 and 10). 
The distance from the intersection of the sight distance 
line on Highway 91 to the approximate center of Geneva 
Road (Highway 114) is 368 feet (Tr. 12). A scale, Ex-
hibit "F·", corresponding to the map, 25 feet to the inch, 
was introduced and received in evidence ( Tr. 12 and 13). 
The Court apparently became confused as to the ac-
tual testimony on this point. In its memorandum deci-
sion at page 3 the· Court says: "As shown on plaintiff's 
Exhibit "A" a line drawn from the stop, sign eastwardly 
past the first obstruction to visibility, gave him an unob-
structed view up the highway for 268 feet." Also further 
on on page· 3 of its memorandum decision the Court refers 
to the sight distance as being 268 feet. The testimony and 
the fact are that the distance is 368 feet, a hundred feet 
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further down the highway. Not only does the testimony 
establish this fact (T·r. 12), hut by using the scale, Ex-
hibit "F:" and ap~plying it to the map, the distance may 
readily he established. The map Exhibit "A" and the 
S'cale Exhibit "F·" are both in evidence. In this instance 
the Court in interpreting the testimony did not give 
plaintiff the benefit of all of the competent evidence most 
favorable to pJ.aintiff, hut actually accepted as evidence 
a distance figure of 268 feet that was contrary to the 
evidence and certainly less favorable to plaintiff than 
the actual figure of 368 feet. It was less favorable to 
plaintiff for the reason that plaintiff could ·see further 
down Highway 91 before leaving the stop sign at the 
southeast corner of Highway 114. If no traffic were in 
view he would naturally have more time in which to cross 
the intersection. He would not have to "race" in order to 
cross ~ver. Had th·e sight distance been 100 feet less 
crossing would have been considerably more hazardous 
and would have put plaintiff on notice that he must pro-
ceed even more cautiously. 
It should also be borne in mind that the figure 268 
~shown on the map Exhibit "A" was excluded from evi-
dence and never thereafter supplied during the trial 
From the actual testimony of 368 feet· and the excluded 
testimony of 268 feet, the inference to he drawn from 
the 368 feet would certainly be more favorable to plain-
tiff than the 268 feet. 
POINT THREE 
THE COURT RELIED UPON MATTERS WHI·CH IT HAD 
SPECIFICALLY EXCLUDED AS EVIDENCE. 
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In its memorandum decision the Court referred to 
and relied upon matters that were actually excluded as 
evidence and not part of the testimony. 
At the bottom of page one of its memorandum de-
cision and the top of page two the, Court says: 
"He was well acquainted with this intersec-
tion, knew it was a very busy way and had to wait 
at times for as much as fifteen minutes for traffic 
to clear." 
On page three of the me1norandum decision the Court 
emphasized further that it relied on excluded testimony 
for it again said: 
"* * * traveling through an intersection which 
he kne·w to he so busy that he had to wait as much 
as fifteen minutes on previous occasions for traf-
fic to clear * * *" 
Attention is now directed to the actual testimony on 
this point and the Court's ruling thereon. On page 52 of 
the transcript of the testimony, Leonard Bates, the plain-
tiff, was asked on direct examination by Mr. Stewart: 
Q. Now can you tell me the experience you had 
in crossing the highway~ 
MR. HANSEN: We object to that, your Honor, 
as being incompetent, irrelevant, and imma-
terial, what happened before that time. I 
don't think it is material or relevant, your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: Well, I am wondering about this, 
Mr. Stewart. I hardly get the point on it. 
Will you tell me what you claim for it~ 
MR. STEWART: Yes, your Honor. I expect to 
show that 91 is a busy highway, and that he 
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had oecasion to cross it daily at least twice 
' ' and that he knew of that situation, and I ex-
pect to show that on many occasions he had 
waited as long as fifteen minutes to get an 
op·ening to cross that highway. And I ex-
pect to show that on this occasion of the acci-
dent, he was five minutes waiting there or 
. ' approocrmately that, before he started to cross 
the highway. 
THE C·OURT: Now let me have the question 
again, will you please, Mr. Reporter~ 
(Question read.) · 
THE COURT : Don't you think your question is 
p·retty general to arrive at that, Mr. Stewart? 
MR. STEW ART: It may he. 
On transcript 53, continuing: 
THE COURT: I think it is, that he can describe 
tipping his hat to a lady, and be just as much 
in answer. It would be immaterial. 
The plaintiff actually testified that highway 91 was 
not always so busy with traffic. Continuing the test.i-
mony (Tr. 53). 
MR. STEW ART: Q. State if you had any diffi-
culty in crossing the highway~ 
A. No, I never had. 
Q. Was there much traffic there¥ 
MR. HANS·EN: On which day¥ 
MR. STEW ART: Any day. 
A. Well, sometimes, there was quite a lot of 
traffic, and on other times you can go and you 
wouldn't hardly strike any. Now you can take 
it coming from the north, and it is lots easier 
to get across, coming back with a load, be-
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cause you see back down the hignway fur-
ther." 
It is plainly evident that the Court was confused, 
if not wholly mislead, by giving consideration to matters 
not actually in evidence. Plaintiff's answer to the ques-
tion above clearly shows that only on sp·ecial occasions 
did he have to wait 'long. The fifteen minute wait not in 
evidence evidently unduly exaggerated th.e amount of 
traffic at this intersection in the mind of the Court and 
doubtless played an important part in its conclusion, 
otherwise why the repetition of the excluded tender of 
testimony in its memorandum decision~ 
Most certainly the inference to be drawn from the 
consideration of the excluded testimony was less favor-
able to plaintiff than if it had never been relied upon by 
the Court. 
P·OINT FOUR 
INACCURATELY COPYING JURY VERDICT INTO ITS 
JUDGMENT AND THEN REFUSING TO CORRECT THE 
ERROR. 
The essential part of the jury verdict, omitting the 
Court and cause for economy of space, reads: 
We, the jury impanelled in the, above entitled 
cause, find the issues in favor of the plaintiff and 
against the defendants jointly and ·severally and 
assess plaintiff's damages as follows: 
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Physical injury, p·ain and suffering ________ $ 
Medica1 Exp'enses ----------------·--·----------------------$ 214.50 
Loss of earnings during recu·peration ...... $1,000.00 
Permanent disability ___________________________________ .$4, 000.00 
Pickup truck ------------------------------------------------$ 565.00 
Total -------------------------------------------- _____ ....... $5, 779.50 
Dated March 16, 1954 
( s) Waldo Lamoreaux 
F·oreman. 
The judgment entered by the Court sup·plied a cipher 
in the verdict opposite the first item "Physical injury, 
pain and suffering" thus $ 0, so that the judgment 
of the· Court reads : 
Physical injury, pain and suffering .......... $ 0 
MedicJal Expenses ----------------------------------------$ 214.50 
Loss of earnings during recup·eration ...... $1,000.00 
Permanent disability ----------------------------------$4,000.00 
Damage to Pickup truck ______________________________ $ 565.00 
Total --------------------------------------------------------$5,779.50 
On Ap~ril 23, 1954, the plaintiff filed Notice of Mo-
tion to he heard on Ap~ril 30, 1954, and it was duly ar-
gued on s1aid date, among other things, that the judgment 
is contrary to the verdict rendered by the jury in said 
matter. In its argument the counsel for plaintiff pointe~ 
out to the Court that the judgment showed a cipher oppo-
site the item "Physical injury, pain and suffering" which 
the verdict did not ~shoiW and that this variance 'between 
the judgment and the verdict was in err'or and did not 
truly represent the verdict. To this matter the, Court con-
cluded that the verdict without the cipher and the judg-
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ment showing a cipher were one and the same thing, that 
they both meant the same thing. The court erred in no~ 
correcting this discrepancy for the reason that without 
the cipher in the verdict it could be inferred that the 
jury had inadvertently overlooked this item, whereas 
with the cipher added it leaves no room for doubt that 
the jury actually concluded that the plaintiff had suffer-
ed no physical injury, pain and suffering. If the plaintiff 
had suffered no injury, pain and suffering he would 
hardly be entitled to recover damages for permanent dis-
ability, which is t1o say that if there were no injury there 
could be no disability, permanent or otherwise. There 
was actual injury, pain and suffering, amply testified to 
and stipulated to as shown by the transcript, hereinafter 
more specifically referred to, so the insertion of the 
cipher was truly a vital misrepresentation. 
Concerning the plaintiff having suffered physical in-
jury, pain and suffering, Mrs. Myrtle Bates, plaintiff's 
wife, testified (Tr. 27 et. seq.) that plaintiff had a cut 2'l2" 
long across the hack of his head requiring four or five 
stitches; ,a lump about the size of a walnut on his right 
cheek bone; a lump about the size of an egg on his fore-
head at the hair line; his right eye swollen shut, his face· 
swollen; his face a mass of 'abrasions; a sprained shoul-
der; his knee swollen and cut, as were his legs in different 
places and bruised and scraped; his hands were swollen 
and he could not shut them; he had seven fractured ribs 
and a punctured liver. 
It was stipulated by counsel for plaintiff and defend-
ant that plaintiff had ·seven ribs fractured (Tr. 29 and 
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30) and the Court stated the stipulation to the jury in 
the following words: "The Court: And the jury may 
accept that stip.ulation as facts established in the case." 
(Tr. 30). 
Mrs. Bate.s testified that plaintiff's memory has not 
'been nearly so good since the accident as it was prior 
thereto (Tr. 31), and Mrs. Hilda Pulley testified about 
plaintiff's memory to the same effect (Tr. 45). Also 
Leonard Bates, the plaintiff ( Tr. 63). 
From the foregoing the ·jury, if it found for the 
plaintiff at all, must find that the p!laintiff had suffered 
physical injury, pain and ~suffering. It is inescapa;ble that 
the omission of any figure opposite that item in its ver-
dict was ·due to oversight and not with deliberate inten-
tion to ignore the item. The -cipher added by the Court 
in its judgment is clearly in error and the Court's re-
fusal to delete the cipher when it was timely called to its 
attention was likewise error. 
On the orbher hand, the defendant has not been in-
jured hy the oversight of the jury in failing to make an 
award of damages to plaintiff sp~ecifically for physical 
injury, pain and suffering. Defendant has suffered no 
financial or p~ecuniary loss on ac0ount of the omission. 
The only one to be hurt by this omission is the plaintiff. 
Plaintiff is satisfied with the amount set out in the ver-
dict and does not raise the question as to the adequacy 
of the verdict. For the sake of accuracy and fairness 
plaintiff desires the judgment to reflect the true fact 
in the judgment on file so that no advantage may be for-
feited or disadvantage suffered as a result of his failure 
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to point out the discrepancy at this. time and to have it 
corrected. 
The substance of the verdict is an award of $5,-
779.50 in favor of the plaintiff. The failure by the jury 
to supply figures opposite each item set out in the verdict 
by the jury g1oes only to form and not to substance. 
In 53 Am. Juris., Sec. 1054 p·. 730 we read: 
"Where the jury hy their verdict for plaintiff 
implicitly finds facts from \Vhich the law pTe-
sumes that general damages follow, so that a 
cause of action for actual or compensatory dam-
ages is conclusively established, the fact that the 
verdict is for exemplary damages 10nly is an error 
in form and not of substance and is not grounds 
for reversal. Under such circumstances it will be 
regarded as a general verdict covering all dam-
ages, both actual and punitive.'' 
CONCLUSION 
It is the sole prerogative of the jury to determine 
questi1ons of fact where reasonable minds might differ 
as to the conclusions reached. Different factors to be 
taken into consideration and determined were speed of 
defendants' truck, speed of plaintiff's truck, exact point 
of impact, ohstructi1ons to vision of plaintiff to the east 
from Highway 114, whether plaintiff or defendant, or 
either of them, kept a proper lookout, and whether the 
failure of either so to do, and which one, was the proxi-
mate cause of the accident. 
It is earnestly contended by the plaintiff that the 
trial court was wrong in its determination that the plain-
tiff was contributorily negligent ;as a matter of law, and 
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that his negligence, if any, was the proximate cause of 
the injury and damage suffered by the plaintiff. The 
judgment 10f the trial court should be set aside and the 
jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff he p~ermitted to 
stand. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT MURRAY STEWART 
Attorney for Plaintiff an.d Appellant 
627 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Received ________ copies of the foregoing brief this 
---------------- day of July, 1954. 
Stewart, Cannon & Hanson 
By------------------------------___________________ .; ............. . 
Attorneys for Defendants and 
Respondents 
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